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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
DIVORCE JURISDICTION AND THE FULL FAITH AND
CREDIT CLAUSE
Propagandists have long recognized that people will accept as
truth that which is most loudly and most often expounded. Thus,
that domicile is essential to divorce jurisdiction for purposes of the
full faith and credit clause has been so often reiterated by lawyers and
judges that there has developed a regard for that concept which can be
described only by the word "reverence." ' In 1954, David-Zieseniss v.
Zieseniss 2 was decided and it was there held that domicile is not the
sole basis of divorce jurisdiction. Immediately thereafter, the law re-
views of the nation descended upon this "heretical view" and pro-
nounced the case anathema.3 Therefore, there is a current need for a
re-appraisal of the requirement of domicile in divorce actions. This
note is concerned with domicile only insofar as the full faith and
credit clause may require it as the basis of divorce jurisdiction.
Historical Development
Authority to grant an absolute divorce in England belonged ex-
clusively to Parliament until 1857,4 when a statute was enacted which
vested such power in the judiciary.5 Accordingly, it became neces-
sary to determine when a court might rightly exercise this power,
and domicile was recognized as the only proper basis of divorce
jurisdiction. 6 However, because a wife's domicile is determined by
that of her husband,7 statutes were passed.which mitigated the effects
of this rule by permitting a wife, in certain cases, to obtain a divorce
though her husband be domiciled elsewhere.8 Today the trend in
1 Justice Clark has referred to domicile as "the sacred cow." See Granville-
Smith v. Granville-Smith, 349 U.S. 1, 24 (1955) (dissenting opinion).
2205 Misc. 836, 129 N.Y.S2d 649 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
3 See, e.g., 23 FO"RHAm L. Ray. 360 (1954) ; 68 HARV. L. REv. 543 (1955);
15 LA. L. REv. 809 (1955); 29 N.Y.U.L. Ray. 1478 (1954).
4 See Alton v. Alton, 207 F.2d 667, 681 (3d Cir. 1953) (dissenting opinion),judgment vacated as moot, 347 U.S. 610 (1954) (per curiam) ; BE-ALE, SELEC-
TiONS FRom A TREATisE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWs 470 (1935); 62 HARV. L.
REV. 514, 515 (1949).
5 Matrimonial Causes Act, 1857, 20 & 21 Vicr. c. 85; see 62 HAav. L. Ray.
514, 515 (1949).
6 See Le Mesurier v. Le Mesurier, [1895] A.C. 517 (P.C.). This case is
regarded as having established the domicile rule of jurisdiction in England. See
Alton v. Alton, supra note 4. However, the question there presented involved,
not British law, but the law of Ceylon. See Cook, Is Haddock v. Haddock
Overruled?, 18 IND. L.J. 165, 168-69 (1943).
See Griswold, Divorce Jurisdiction And Recognition Of Divorce Decrees-
A Comparative Study, 65 HARV. L. Ray. 193, 196 (1951).
s E.g., Matrimonial Causes Act, 1944, 7 & 8 Gao. 6, c. 43; Matrimonial
Causes Act, 1937, 1 EDw. 8 & 1 Gao. 6, c. 57, § 13; see Griswold, supra note 7,
at 197-200. "None of these statutes purports to affect the domicil of the wife.
Under English law, the wife's domicil remains that of her husband. But the
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England is away from domicile as a basis of jurisdiction.9
In the United States, the power to regulate matters of domestic
relations lies exclusively with the states.10 The history of the states'
power to divorce parallels the development in England." Originally
the state legislatures were vested with the divorce power 12 in a
manner similar to Parliament.13 However, because of the abuses
which prevailed, constitutional provisions were enacted which pro-
hibited the exercise of the divorce power by the legislature,14 and it
was transferred to courts of equity.15
Domicile is recognized today as a valid basis of divorce juris-
diction.16 The origin of this concept is not entirely clear, but Pro-
fessor Cook has made the following observation:
It [domicile as a basis of jurisdiction] goes back at least to Story's treatise.
Writing in 1834 Story relied, among other things, upon a few early American
decisions, chiefly in Massachusetts. An examination of the Massachusetts cases
he cites and other early cases from that State shows that the cases in question
were all based upon a statute of Massachusetts passed in 1795 which took
divorce out of the hands of the Governor and Council and vested it in the
courts. That statute provided that a suit for divorce must be brought in the
county "where the parties live," the purpose being to make it unnecessary for
them to go to Boston .... 17
Thus, it would appear that domicile might have become accepted as a
basis of divorce jurisdiction "under the influence of the creative
effect of these statutes is to make this rule virtually inapplicable as far as
jurisdiction of divorce is concerned. English courts may now grant divorces in
many cases where the parties are not domiciled in England, and indeed, where
the defendant has never been domiciled in England." Griswold, rnpra note 7,
at 200 (emphasis added).
9 See Cowen, Divorce and the Domicile, 68 L.Q. REv. 88, 89 (195?).
10 See Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U.S. 14, 28-38 (1903) ; In re Burrus, 136
U.S. 586, 593-94 (1890) (dictum) ; Irxzaa, MAmnIAG. AND DIvoRcE §A4 (3d ed.
1946) ; 40 IOWA L. Rxv. 667, 669 (1955).
11 "When this country was settled, the power to grant a divorce from the
bonds of matrimony was exercised by the Parliament of England.... Naturally,
the legislative assemblies of the colonies followed the example of Parliament and
treated the subject as one within their province. And until a recent period
legislative divorces have been granted, with few exceptions, in all the States."
Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 206 (1888).
12 See Pound, Foreword-A synposium In The Law Of Divorce, in
SELECTED ESSAYS ON FAMILY LAW 879 (1950).
13 See 1 CoolHrY , CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 208 (8th ed., Carrington
1927). In Maynard v. Hill, supra note 11, the Supreme Court upheld a legis-
lative divorce in the Territory of Oregon.
14 Eg. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 9; N.J. CoNsT. art. 4, § 7, 1 1; PA. CoNSr.
art. 3,1 § 7.
is See note 12 supra.
16 See Williams v. North Carolina (I), 317 U.S. 287, 298-99 (1942); BEALE,
SELFcrioNS FROM A TREATISE ON THE CoNFLICT OF LAWS § 114.1, at 476 (1935) ;
RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 111 (1934) ; Comment, 16 HARV. L. REv.
448 (1903) ; 12 YALE L.J. 385 (1903).
17 Cook, Is Haddock v. Haddock Overrided?, 18 IND. L.J. 165, 166 (1943).
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scholarship" of Story.' 8 Subsequently, the domicile basis was adopted
by the British courts. 19 Whatever the history of the domiciliary basis
of jurisdiction may be, and regardless of the stability of the foundation
upon which it rests, it has become firmly embedded in Anglo-
American law. 20
Residence requirements which have been written into state di-
vorce laws 21 have been uniformly construed to mean domicile.22
However, various state statutes have provided for exceptional cases
in which domicile is not required.23 Particular reference should be
had to those states which permit servicemen to secure a divorce if
they have been stationed within the state for a specified period of
time.2 4  It must be noted that according to the principles of conflict
of laws, such servicemen could hardly be deemed to have established a
domicile within such a state.2 5  It would appear, therefore, that just
as England has been regarded as departing from the stringent require-
ment of domicile,26 so may the United States.2 7
Constitutional Aspects
While the power to regulate divorce rests exclusively with the
states, they must adhere to constitutional mandates in the exercise of
is Alton v. Alton, 207 F.2d 667, 681 (3d Cir. 1953), judgment vacated as
moot, 347 U.S. 610 (1954) (per curiam).
'9 Ibid.
20 See Stimson, Jurisdiction in Divorce Cases: The Unsoundiess of the
Domiciliary Theory, 42 A.B.A.J. 222 (1956). This author considers another
possible explanation for acceptance of the domicile doctrine. He alludes to early
American reliance on Scotch cases and suggests that possibly this doctrine is
a product of a misunderstanding of those cases.2 1 E.g., N.Y. Civ. Pa.c. AcT § 1147(3); CAL. Civ. CODE § 128 (Deering
1949); OHIO Rzv. CODE ANN. § 3105.03 (Baldwin 1953); PA. STAT. A.N. tit.
23, § 16 (Purdon 1955) ; UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-1 (Supp. 1955).
22 See, e.g., Clapp v. Clapp, 272 App. Div. 378, 379, 71 N.Y.S.2d 354, 356
(lst Dep't 1947) ; Ungemach v. Ungemach, 61 Cal. App. 2d 29, 142 P.2d 99,
102 (1943) ; Glassman v. Glassman, 75 Ohio App. 47, 60 N.E.2d 716, 718 (1944) ;
Verbeck v. Verbeck, 160 Pa. Super. 515, 52 A.2d 241, 243 (1947); Weiss v.
Weiss, 111 Utah 353, 179 P.2d 1005, 1007 (1947).
23 E.g., N.Y. Civ. PkAc. ACT § 1147(1), (2) (" 1. Where both parties were
residents of the state when the offense was committed. 2. Where the parties
were married within this state.") ; CoLO. R:Ev. STAT. ANN. § 46-1-3 (1953)
(where the offense was committed within the state) ; Mo. REv. STAT. § 452.050
(1949) (where the offense was committed within the state or while one or both
of the parties resided within the state).2 4 E.g., KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1502 (1949), Craig v. Craig, 143 Kan.
624, 56 P.2d 464 (1936); N.M. STAT. ANN. §22-7-4 (1953), Crownover v.
Crownover, 58 N.M. 597, 274 P.2d 127 (1954).
25 "A soldier or sailor, if he is ordered to a station to which he must go and
live in quarters assigned to him, cannot acquire a domicil there. . ."
RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 21, comment c (1934). See Craig v. Craig,
su pra. note 24 at 466. This proposition is substantially contained in RESTATE.MENT.
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 21, comment d at 79 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1954).
26 See note 9 supra.
27 See Stimson, Jurisdiction in Divorce Cases: The Unsoundness of the
Domiciliary Theory, 42 A.B.A.J. 222, 224 (1956).
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this power. Accordingly, they must administer their divorce laws so
as to conform to the requirements of due process; failure to do so will
render a decree of divorce invalid.28 But beyond this, the question
remains whether the decree of one state must be recognized by an-
other. It is with this problem that we are concerned. The Federal
Constitution provides that:
Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records,
and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by
general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings
shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.29
Acting on this constitutional authority, Congress has required that
judgments ". . . shall have the same full faith and credit in every
court within the United States ... as they have by law or usage in the
courts of such State... from which they are taken." 30 Contrary to
what the language of these provisions would seem to import, a judg-
ment of one state does not become a judgment in every other state.3 '
It is merely conclusive of the merits in the other states, if the decree-
ing state had proper jurisdiction.32 These last few words create the
problems surrounding migratory divorce. If the decreeing forum
lacks jurisdiction, the divorce need not be recognized by a sister state.
It is therefore necessary to determine what the highest judicial au-
thority on the Constitution has declared to be essential to divorce
jurisdiction.
Supreme Court Decisions
Though the following are by no means all of the Supreme Court
cases which deal with divorce jurisdiction, they are the ones most often
relied upon for the proposition that divorce jurisdiction must be
founded upon domicile. The first case to be noted is Atherton v.
Atherton,3 3 decided in 1901, which gave expression to the concept of
matrimonial domicile. The Court there held that full faith and credit
must be accorded a decree rendered by the state wherein the spouses
last resided as husband and wife and the plaintiff was domiciled. In
that same year, the companion cases of Bell v. Bell 34 and Streitwoif
v. Streitwolf 35 were decided. Both held that a divorce obtained by a
spouse who had not complied with the residence requirements of the
28 See Griswold, Divorce Jurisdiction And Recognition Of Divorce Decrees-
A Comparative Study, 65 HARv. L. REv. 193, 212 n.57 (1951).
29 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
3028 U.S.C. § 1738 (1952).
31 See Williams v. North Carolina (II), 325 U.S. 226 (1945); German
Say. and Loan Soc'y v. Dormitzer, 192 U.S. 125 (1904).
32 See Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908); D'Arcy v. Ketchum, 18
U.S. (11 How.) 586 (1850).
3 181 U.S. 155 (1901).
34 181 U.S. 175 (1901).
35 181 U.S. 179 (1901).
19561]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
decreeing forum need not be recognized by a sister state.3 6 Two years
later, Andrews v. Andrews 37 held valid a Massachusetts statute which
prohibited ". . . the enforcement in Massachusetts of a divorce ob-
tained in another State by a citizen of Massachusetts who, in fraud of
the laws of the State of Massachusetts, whilst retaining his domicile,
goes into another State for the purpose of there procuring a decree of
divorce." 38 The decree in question had been granted in South Dakota
where the petitioner had never acquired a bona fide domicile.
In 1906, one of the most controversial cases in the area of divorce
jurisdiction was decided; Haddock v. Haddock 39 held that an ex
parte divorce decree, rendered by one state when the matrimonial
domicile was in another, need not be accorded validity. The members
of the Court, however, were not in full agreement with this position.
Justice Holmes, in a dissenting opinion, stated:
... I can find no basis for giving a greater jurisdiction to the courts of the
husband's domicile when the married pair happens to have resided there for a
month, even if with an intent to make it a permanent abode, than if they had
not lived there at all.40
Justice Holmes' view was adopted as law thirty-six years later
when the Court, in Williams v. North Carolina,41 held that a divorce
decree rendered at the plaintiff's domicile must be given extraterri-
torial effect, regardless of where the matrimonial domicile was located.
This decision was followed by the second Williams case,42 which held
that one state is not bound by another state's ex parte finding of
jurisdiction.
It clearly appears from the discussion above that bona fide dom-
icile is a proper basis of divorce jurisdiction, and when a divorce is
based upon domicile it must be given full faith and credit in every
other state. We shall turn next to the subject which has provided the
impetus for this re-examination of domicile and divorce.
36 ".. . [B]y the law of Pennsylvania every petitioner for a divorce must
have had a bona fide residence within the State for one year next before the
filing of the petition. Penn. Stats. March 13, 1815, c. 109, § 11; May 8, 1854,
c. 629, § 2.... Upon this record, therefore, the court in Pennsylvania had nojurisdiction of the husband's suit for divorce, because neither party had a
domicil in Pennsylvania. . . ." Bell v. Bell, 181 U.S. 175, 177-78 (1901)
(emphasis added). The Streitwolf case was decided wholly on the authority
of the Bell case.
37 188 U.S. 14 (1903).
38 Id. at 30. In Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948), the Andrews case
was overruled insofar as it permitted collateral attack by a spouse who had
appeared in the foreign divorce action. To this extent, a statute similar to the
one involved in that case is ineffective.
39 201 U.S. 562 (1906), overruled, Williams v. North Carolina (I), 317
U.S. 287 (1942).4 0 Id. at 632.
41317 U.S. 287 (1942).
42325 U.S. 226 (1945).
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Section 1147(2) of the New York Civil Practice Act
The recent case of David-Zieseniss v. Zieseniss 43 considered the
necessity of domicile as the basis of divorce jurisdiction. In that case.
neither spouse was domiciled in New York at the time of the action,
but the parties had entered into the marriage relationship in that state.
The plaintiff relied on Section 1147(2) of the New York Civil Prac-
tice Act which confers divorce jurisdiction where the parties were
married within the state. The court denied the defendants' motion to
vacate service by publication 44 and to dismiss the complaint, holding
that marriage within the state is sufficient for divorce jurisdiction and
service by publication. It was unequivocally denied that domicile is
the sole basis of divorce jurisdiction.
Judicial treatment of Section 1147(2) has varied during the
ninety-four years that it has been on the statute books. Some of the
New York courts have felt that, despite the clear language of this sec-
tion, domicile is essential to divorce jurisdiction. 45 A recent case
illustrative of this view is Huneker v. Huneker.46  There the court
refused to assume jurisdiction where the only ground of jurisdiction
was the fact of marriage within the state. However, several cases have
taken the contrary position 47 and, as was done in the Zieseniss case,
have given the statute a literal interpretation.
43 205 Misc. 836, 129 N.Y.S.2d 649 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
4 "An order directing the service of a summons upon a defendant, by pub-
lication, may be made upon the application of the plaintiff.... 1. Where the
complaint demands judgment annulling a marriage, or for a divorce, or a
separation." N.Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr § 232.
45 "The general rule to be derived from principles of universal application
is that the courts of this state have no power to adjudge the status of parties
residing beyond its jurisdiction. It is not likely that this rule was changed or
intended to be changed by the provisions of the Code." Gray v. Gray, 143 N.Y.
354, 357, 38 N.E. 301, 302 (1894). See also Powell v. Powell, 211 App. Div.
750, 757, 208 N.Y. Supp. 153, 159 (1st Dep't 1925); Barber v. Barber, 89 Misc.
519, 522-23, 151 N.Y. Supp. 1064, 1066-67 (Sup. Ct. 1915). Section 1170-b of
the New York Civil Practice Act provides: "In an action for divorce, . . .
where the court refuses to grant such relief . . . [because of a valid foreign
ex parte divorce procured by the husband] the court may, nevertheless, render
in the same action such judgment as justice may require for the maintenance of
the wife." It becomes apparent, therefore, that if Section 1147(2) be declared
not effective to provide divorce jurisdiction within the meaning of the full faith
and credit clause, there may be serious effects upon the right of a nonresident
wife to obtain maintenance in New York. This is for the reason that the
right to obtain maintenance under Section 1170-b depends on the plaintiff's
standing to secure a divorce.
46 57 N.Y.S.2d 99 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
47 See Ackerman v. Ackerman, 200 N.Y. 72, 76-77, 93 N.E. 192, 194 (1910).
It was held in this case that marriage alone within the state is sufficient for the
exercise of divorce jurisdiction. See also Becker v. Becker, 58 App. Div. 374,
376-77, 69 N.Y. Supp. 75, 77 (1st Dep't 1901); Oettgen v. Oettgen, 196 Misc.
937, 941, 94 N.Y.S.2d 168, 172 (Sup. Ct. 1949); cf. Schildkraut v. Schildkraut,
226 App. Div. 747, 233 N.Y. Supp. 585, 586 (2d Dep't 1929).
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The legislative history of Section 1147(2)48 leaves no doubt that
the fact of marriage alone was intended to provide a basis of divorce
jurisdiction. This being so, the question presents itself whether a di-
vorce rendered upon such grounds must be given effect in other states.
The answer depends on whether domicile is the sole and exclusive
basis of divorce jurisdiction within the rules laid down by the Supreme
Court.
Is Domicile Exclusive?
The idol of domicile has not escaped the attacks of some learned
jurists who perhaps may be considered iconoclasts by those who wor-
ship before its altar. Mr. Justice Rutledge has viewed domicile as an
amorphous, highly variable common-law conception.40  Indeed, Mr.
48 "In 1787, it was enacted that the Chancellor might grant divorces 'where
the parties are inhabitants of this State' (L. 1787, ch. 69).
"In 1813, it was enacted that the Chancellor might entertain bills for divorce,
first, where the parties were inhabitants of this State at the time of the adultery,
second, when the marriage was solemnized in New York and the injured party
was a resident in this State both at the time of the adultery and when he or
she brought the proceedings. (2 Van Ness & Woodworth, Rev. L. [1813], ch.
102, p. 197.)
"The Revised Statutes of 1830 contained the provision that a divorce might
be decreed in New York 'where the marriage has been solemnized, or has taken
place within this state, and the injured party, at the time of the commission of
the offense, and at the time of exhibiting the bill of complaint, shall be an
actual inhabitant of this state' (Rev. Stat. of N.Y., part II, ch. VIII, tit. I,
art. third, § 38).
"It was then by chapter 246 of the Laws of 1862, that that provision of the
Revised Statutes was amended to read 'Where the marriage has been solemnized
or has taken place within this state, or where the injured party at the time of
the commission of the offense and at the time of exhibiting the bill of complaint
shall be an actual inhabitant of this state.'
"Marriage within the State as a fact conferring jurisdiction to grant divorce
thus was not introduced into the law by chapter 246 of the Laws of 1862.
Marriage within the State coupled with residence within the State was a ground
for jurisdiction from 1813 to 1862, and the sole purpose of the 1862 amendment
was to make marriage within the State, without the additional fact of residence
within the State, a fact which in and of itself, without more, conferred juris-
diction. Chapter 69 of the Laws of 1787, and chapter 246 of the Laws of
1862 were repealed by chapter 65 of the Laws of 1909, but by that time the
provision that mere marriage within the State, without residence here, givesjurisdiction to grant divorce had been carried into the Code of Civil Procedure(§ 1756), which was then carried into and is now contained in section 1147 of
the Civil Practice Act.
"Continuously since 1862, therefore, it has been the statutory law of New
York that marriage within the State is, in and of itself and without more, a
fact which gives jurisdiction to grant divorce." David-Zieseniss v. Zieseniss,
205 Misc. 836, 839-40, 129 N.Y.S.2d 649, 651-52 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
,9 See Williams v. North Carolina (II), 325 U.S. 226, 245 (1945) (dissenting
opinion). See also Reese, Does Domicil Bear A Single Meaning?, 55 COLUM.
L. REv. 589, 595-97 (1955).
[ VOL. 30
Justice Clark has gone further to "defile" this concept in observing that
"the only constitutional bugaboo is a judge-made one, domicile." 50
It must be noted at this juncture that in every case in which the
Supreme Court stated domicile to be essential to divorce jurisdiction,
a state statute which required domicile was involved.5' Thus, the
Court has never been required to hold that domicile is constitutionally
necessary before a divorce must be recognized in states outside the
decreeing forum.52 The closest that the Supreme Court has come to
deciding whether domicile is necessary was when the cases of Alton
v. Alton 3 and Granville-Smith v. Granville-Smith 54 came before it.
In both cases the validity of a statute of the Virgin Islands was ques-
tioned. It provided that:
If the plaintiff [in an action for divorce] is within the district at the time of
the filing of the complaint and has been continuously for six weeks immediately
prior thereto, this shall be prima facie evidence of domicile, and where the
defendant has been personally served within the district or enters a general
appearance in the action, then the court shall have jurisdiction of the action
and of the parties thereto without further reference to domicile. . . .55
In the Alton case, both parties were residents of Connecticut. The
plaintiff went to the Virgin Islands and, after a six-week sojourn,
commenced a suit for divorce. Although an appearance was entered
by the defendant-husband, the district court ruled that it had no juris-
diction over the action since the plaintiff was unable to produce evi-
dence of domicile. The judgment was affirmed by the Third Circuit
on the ground that the statute did not require domicile, which was
considered to be essential to divorce jurisdiction. This case was ap-
pealed but never considered by the Supreme Court, since the question
was rendered moot by another divorce obtained by the parties.5" Ia
1955, the statute came before the Court in the Granville-Snith case,
which involved substantially the same material facts as the Alton case.
However, the constitutional necessity of domicile was not discussed.
The Court invalidated the statute simply on the ground that Congress
had not granted power to the Virgin Islands to enact this legislation.
The theory was that Congress had granted power to enact laws of local
application only, while the statute in question operated to attract im-
ported divorce suits. However, though the Court did not expressly
50 Granville-Smith v. Granville-Smith, 349 U.S. 1, 27 (1955) (dissenting
opinion).
5" See 54 COLUm. L. REv. 1165 (1954).
52 See 40 IOWA L. REv. 667, 668 (1955) ; 15 LA. L. Rav. 809 (1955).
53207 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1953), judgment vaxated as moot, 347 U.S. 610
(1954) (per curiam).
54 349 U.S. 1 (1955).
55 Quoted in Stimson, Jurisdiction in Divorce Cases: The Unsoundness of
the Domiciliary Tleory, 42 A.B.A.J. 222, 225 (1956).
56 See Stimson, supra note 55.
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bottom its decision on domicile, this concept was the underlying ratio
decidendi, as Mr. Justice Clark indicated in his dissent57
Many of the Supreme Court cases do contain dicta which clearly
state that domicile is a constitutionally necessary ingredient of divorce
jurisdiction.5 8 Before referring to this dicta, the following thought
should be considered:
... [T]he trained common law investigator (like the trained newsman) always
has weighed carefully the language of the opinion against the facts of the case
and has been cautious not to give a wider scope of importance to the judges'
remarks than the facts of the case demanded. In recent years, however, there
has been a growing tendency, formerly confined to relatively unschooled lawyers,
among some teachers and commentators to treat the statements in a judicial
opinion as of greater importance than the case and to treat the case, a transient
phenomenon, as of significance only as the occasion of the opinions. Hence a
growing carelessness in appreciation of the case itself and in elaboration of the
import of particular generalized postulates in the opinions .... 59
Because of the sweeping language contained in most of the cases
which deal with divorce jurisdiction, it is necessary to heed this warn-
ing. An example of such broad language is the statement of Mr.
Justice Frankfurter in the second Williams case. There he said,
"Under our system of law, judicial power to grant a divorce-juris-
diction, strictly speaking-is founded on domicile." 60 He cited as his
authority Bell v. Bell 61 and Andrews v. Andrews.6 2  No doubt those
cases contain comments which tend to support the statement; 63 how-
ever, nothing could be clearer than that they do not hold what Mr.
Justice Frankfurter would attribute to them. 64 Similar dogmatic
57 "The majority's holding that the Islands' law is not 'of local application'
can be appreciated more fully by asking the question, 'What type of a divorce
law would be of local application?' The majority does not pass on this, but its
whole reasoning is founded on the proposition that only domicile will suffice."
Granville-Smith v. Granville-Smith, 349 U.S. 1, 23 (1955) (dissenting opinion).
58 See, e.g., Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 349 (1948) ; Williams v. North
Carolina (II), 325 U.S. 226, 229, 230, 238, 239 (1945); Williams v. North
Carolina (I), 317 U.S. 287, 308 (1942) (dissenting opinion); Bell v. Bell,
181 U.S. 175, 177 (1901).59 Bingham, Song Of Sixpence-Some Comments On Williams v. North
Carolina, 29 CoRNxE. L.Q. 1, 7 (1943).
60 Williams v. North Carolina (II), supra note 58 at 229.
61 181 U.S. 175 (1901).
62 188 U.S. 14 (1903).
63 "... [Diomicil in that State was essential to give jurisdiction to the
courts of such State to render a decree of divorce which would have extra-
territorial effect." Id. at 41. "No valid divorce from the bond of matri-
mony can be decreed on constructive service by the courts of a State in which
neither party is domiciled." Bell v. Bell, 181 U.S. 175, 177 (1901).
64 The statement in the Bell case referred to in footnote 63 was made by the
Court without benefit of authority. Actually, even a casual reading of that case
brings forth the point that the divorce was struck down because of non-
compliance with the statutory residence requirements of the decreeing forum.
See note 36 supra. Slightly more persuasive is the Andrews case. The Court
there expressly pointed out that the existence of a state statute requiring domi-
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utterances may be found in other Supreme Court decisions.
But what do these cases say is constitutionally necessary before a
decree need be accorded full faith and credit in all the states? It is
not simply the factual elements that go to make up domicile-an in-
dividual's physical presence and his intent to remain within a state.65
The constitutional requirement goes beyond that. Perhaps the clearest
statement of the jurisdictional basis required by the Supreme Court
for full faith and credit is that:
The state is vitally interested in the marriage relation because it affects society
as a whole, its welfare and continued well-being. This interest is based upon a
general public order and sound public policy, in pursuance whereof conditions
are prescribed upon, which persons may enter into and then dissolve the marital
relation. To enforce such policy the state provides penalties for the violation
of its marriage laws. As the majority of the Court assert, the state interest
is not identical with that of the parties to the marital relation.... Were the
marriage relation not interwoven with public policy the parties would be free
to terminate it at will.66
This thought permeates the Court's decisions on the subject. In the
first Williams case, Mr. Justice Douglas announced that "Domicile
creates a relationship to the state which is adequate for numerous
exercises of state power." 67 He further noted that:
It [the existence of the power of a state to alter the marital status of its
domiciliaries] is dependent on the relationship which domicil creates .... 68
It becomes clear that domicile is merely a cause of a particular
result; it is this result, vie., the state's relation of interest to marriage
as a matter of public concern, which is the basis of jurisdiction for the
purpose of the full faith and credit clause. Since domicile is mere
matter of form it should be given commensurate significance and not
cile was not essential to the efficacy of that fact as prerequisite to divorcejurisdiction. Of course, the point may be made that a court's denial of a fact
does not serve to negative the existence of that fact, and its subsequent use as
a distinguishing element remains. But prescinding from that point, stress should
be placed on the fact that in the Andrews case there was no possible basis ofjurisdiction other than domicile. The spouses had never cohabited in the de-
creeing forum; the petitioner had never been there prior to his abortive attempt
to establish divorce domicile, nor does it appear from the opinion that that
state recognized another basis of jurisdiction. Indeed, any statement that domi-
cile was essential, when considered under these circumstances, seems perfectly
proper. But it may not go further than that.
65 "To acquire a domicil of choice, a person must establish a dwelling-place
with the intention of making it his home." RESTATEmENT, CONac'r oF LAWS§ 15(2) (1934). See Stimson, Jurisdiction in Divorce Cases: The Unsoundness
of the Domiciliary Theory, 42 A.B.A.J. 222, 294 (1956); Lindey, Foreign
Divorce: Where Do, We Go From Here?, 17 U. Prr. L. Rnv. 125, 139 (1956).
06 Lorenzen, Extraterritorial Divorce-Williams v. North Carolina II, 54
YALE L.J. 799, 802 (1945) (emphasis added).
6 Williams v. North Carolina (I), 317 U.S. 287, 298 (1942) (emphasis
added).
s Id. at 300 (emphasis added).
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confused with substance. If another form may be substituted for that
of domicile, without essentially altering the substance, then that other
form also may be set up as a constitutional basis of divorce jurisdic-
tion. Thus, the question arises as to whether the sole fact that the
marriage was created within the state is such a form. Is not this fact
in and of itself, causative of ". . . a relationship to the state which is
adequate for numerous exercises of state power"? 69
Jurisdiction of the Marriage Forum
Marriage and the family constitute the foundation of the whole
social structure. 7° Mutual privileges and responsibilities arise solely
from the fact of marriage.71 Although the right to marry finds its
basis in natural law,7 2 the state is empowered to regulate it.78 It
makes its laws available to those who would assume the profound re-
lationship of man and wife. When two persons avail themselves of
these laws, the state aids in launching the relationship which was re-
ferred to above as the "foundation" of society. These factors have
evoked references to the state as the "third party" to the marriage
contract.74  Such an allusion serves well to point up the great interest
which a state has in marriages which are contracted within its borders.
It is one postulate of this Note that the state, having once aided
so substantially in the formation of the marital relationship in pur-
suance of its declared and rightful interest, does not cease to be in-
terested upon the conclusion of the marriage ceremony. Its interest
continues so long as the parties remain married, whether or not they
continue to reside within that state. The validity of this position re-
veals itself with far greater force when the contrary position is asserted
-that as soon as the spouses depart from its territorial borders, the
state, having launched them on "the most important relation in life," 75
disclaims any and all responsibility for them. Indeed, such a position
relegates marriage and the state to the same echelon of causal respon-
sibility as the candy bar and the vending machine. Further, the
sovereign state of New York has expressly declared its continuing
69 Id. at 298.
70 Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211 (1888) (dictum); see McCarran,
Full Faith .... in 2 DIvoRcE AND FAMILY RELATIONS 109 (1950); Walsh,
Marriage And Civil Law, 23 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 209, 210-11 (1949).
71 For example, the right to consortium, the wife's right to support and the
husband's corresponding duty to support the wife.
72 See Encyclical, Pope Pius XI, On Christian Marriage, translated in FIVE
GREAT ENcYcLicALs 77, 78 (1939).
73 See KEEzER, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE §§ 4-6 (3d ed. 1946) ; 2 ScHOULER,
MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, SEPARATION AND DoMEsTIc RELATIONS § 1074 (6th ed.
1921).
4 See MACKAY, MARRIAGE AND DIVoRCE 7 (2d ed. 1951); 2 ScHOULER,
op. cit. supra note 73, § 1073.
15 Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888).
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interest. 76 Thus, it is submitted that the state of marriage has an in-
terest in the relationship which is a continuing one.
To effect a change in domicile, there must be actual presence in a
new locality and the intention to remain there permanently. Until
these two elements concur, a domicile previously acquired continues.
Thus, one may sever all physical connection with a state for an in-
definite period of time and yet continue to be a domiciliary. Being
such a domiciliary, one could return to that state and obtain a valid
divorce decree which would be binding in other states under the rule
discussed above. If in such a case the severance of the physical ties
between state and person does not operate to discontinue the in-
corporeal relationship of interest, it is difficult to see why a different
result should be reached when the spouses leave the marrying state.
It is the second postulate of this Note that the marital forum's
interest continues in the relationship of marriage because of the state's
great and direct interest in the institution of marriage within its own
borders and the regard which its own domiciliaries hold for that insti-
tution.
The state is vitally interested in the marital relationship of its own
domiciliaries. 77 The stability of this relationship depends upon the de-
gree of esteem in which the people hold the institution of marriage.
Ready availability of divorce tends to undermine the foundation of the
marital relationship. 78 The attitude of the several states on the sub-
ject of the permanence and indissolubility of marriage varies widely;
this is evidenced by the great diversity in the divorce laws of the
states.7 9 Whereas in some states a divorce may be obtained for rela-
tively insignificant reasons,8 0 others require serious grounds.81 New
York is a jurisdiction which has stringent laws, the only ground for
divorce being adultery82 Thus, we have a state which has a declared
policy in respect to marriage and divorce. This policy it is entitled to
76 N.Y. CIV. PRAc. AcT § 1147 (2).
7 See Williams v. North Carolina (I), 317 U.S. 287 (1942) (passim);
2 SciouLER, op. cit. supra note 73, § 1478.
78 Justice Jackson, in his dissent, indicated that permitting a petitioner to
establish a new domicile and obtain a divorce has the effect of ushering in
"a new order of matrimonial confusion and irresponsibility." Williams v.
North Carolina (I), 317 U.S. 287, 324 (1942).
79 Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 369 (1948) (dissenting opinion).
so (a) Refusal by wife to inwve to new residence [TENN. CODE ANN.
§8426(8) (Williams 1934)]; (b) Violent temper [FLA. STAT. ANN. §65.04(5)
(1943)]; (c) Indignities [AIz. CoDE ANN. §27-802(5) (1939); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 23, § 10(f) (Purdon 1930); Wyo. Comp. STAT. ANN. §3-5905(8)(1945)]; (d) Incompatibility [N.M. STAT. ANN. §22-7-1(8) (1953)].
81 (a) Neu, York-adultery only. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. AcT § 1147; (b) New
Jersey-adultery, desertion and extreme cruelty. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2:50-2(1939) ; (c) South Carolina-adultery, desertion (1 year), physical cruelty and
habitual drunkenness. S.C. CODE § 20-101 (1952); (d) Virginia-adultery,
impotency, conviction, fugitive, incarceration, desertion (2 years), pre-marital
conception and prostitution. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-91 (1950).
s2 N.Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr § 1147.
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have. However, if parties who marry there may proceed to other
jurisdictions and make what New York would consider a mockery of
marital bonds, it has an effect upon the dignity of the institution of
marriage within that state. It follows then that such a state has a
sufficient interest in preserving the relationship of the absent spouses.
Both postulates one and two have demonstrated an interest on the
part of the marrying forum in preserving the marriage which was
created within its borders. This being so, it follows that the marry-
ing state has the power and the right to exercise divorce jurisdiction.
For marriage is a permanent relationship; the state's right to divorce
is derived from its interest to preserve that institution. 83
It is true that there may be a jurisdiction which has a greater
interest in the marital status of the parties than the marrying forum.
A prime example would be the jurisdiction wherein both spouses are
domiciled, which, as the cases recognize, has a deep and pervading in-
terest in their status. However, the existence of a greater interest
does not deny the presence or efficacy of a lesser one. This is easily
proven by the fact that existing law permits a plaintiff to obtain a
divorce in a jurisdiction wherein the spouses never cohabited, in dero-
gation of the interest of the state of the marital domicile. 4 Once the
cloak of fiction is lifted from the interest of the state wherein the plain-
tiff alone is domiciled, it will be seen that in many cases the marriage
forum has a greater interest. The instances of fraudulent acquisition
of domicile by plaintiffs are innumerable.85 Indeed jurisdictions like
Nevada do a "thriving business" in divorcing out-of-staters.8 6 It
should be noted that the Court in Haddock v. Haddock 87 was fearful
of the very abuses that have arisen since the first Williams case. Fur-
thermore, the state of the plaintiff's domicile does not have within its
83 See I BISHOP, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE AND SEPARATION §§ 38, 39 (1891).
84 See Williams v. North Carolina (I), 317 U.S. 287 (1942). North
Carolina, the state of the matrimonial domicile, was compelled to recognize a
Nevada decree. Neither of the respondents in that divorce action had ever
been in Nevada.
85"... [Tihe Nevada divorce machinery has become so smooth that the
husband-to-be often flies out to be present at the divorce, gets married at the
church next door, and then accompanies his new wife to their 'new' domicile."
Granville-Smith v. Granville-Smith, 349 U.S. 1, 23 (1954) (dissenting opinion).
Indeed, the divorcee never intended to remain in that state. Id. at 27.
86 Id. at 23.
87 "Under the rule contended for [recognition of decree rendered at forum of
petitioner's domicile only] it would follow that the States whose laws were the
most lax as to length of residence required for domicil, as to causes for divorce
and to speed of procedure concerning divorce, would in effect dominate all the
other States. In other words, any person who was married in one State and
who wished to violate the marital obligations would be able, by following the
lines of least resistance, to go into the State whose laws were the most lax, and
there avail of them for the purpose of the severance of the marriage tie and
the destruction of the right of the other party to the marriage contract, to the
overthrow of the laws and public policy of the other States." Haddock v.
Haddock, 201 U.S. 562, 574 (1906), overruled, Williams v. North Carolina (I),
317 U.S. 287 (1942) (emphasis added).
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borders the marital relationship in as full a form as does the marriage
forum.
One wonders how serious the Court in the first Williams case
was when it gave expression to the thought that the plaintiff's state of
domicile had an interest in the marriage as great as the state of the
matrimonial domicile. it would appear from the opinion that the
Court decided as it did more out of a fear of the possibility of an in-
crease in bastards and bigamy.88
Denial of Domicile in State Courts
Though state endorsement of the domicile concept is widespread,
that theory has been denied exclusiveness in some cases. The primary
occasion of such an approach has been statutes which provide for the
maintenance of divorce actions by servicemen in the state wherein they
are stationed. In Craig v. Craig,s 9 a Kansas court sustained such a
statute,90 although it noted that "persons residing... [on a military
reservation] could not establish an actual permanent residence or
domicile [there] . . . ." 1 In Crownover v. Crownover,92 the court
expressly refused to follow the Alton case. The statute provided that
continuous residence on a military post for one year would confer
divorce jurisdiction.9 3 The court sustained the statute on the rather
novel ground that "military domicile" would be acquired by such a
plaintiff. It would seem that such a position is untenable and flies in
the face of the honest observation of the court in the Craig case.
Although the attempt to sustain the statute on the ground of domicile
seems abortive, it would appear equally clear that residence for one
year does supply a sufficient nexus between the person and the state
to justify the exercise of jurisdiction. As a last example, there is the
case of Gould v. Gould.94 There the New York Court of Appeals
recognized, on principles of comity, a divorce decree rendered in
France, although both parties were domiciled in New York.
These cases, and the Zieseniss case, 95 did not deal directly with
the compulsory extraterritorial effect to be given these decrees. How-
ever, they did recognize that domicile was not a sine qua non to di-
vorce jurisdiction. If, then, a basis other than domicile was found to
be present, one wonders what magic there is in the full faith and
credit clause which causes these bases to disintegrate. The full faith
and credit clause is not operative in determining jurisdiction, but is
merely an ex post facto consideration in determining the extraterri-
torial effect that need be given decrees. Jurisdiction either exists or
s8 See Williams v. North Carolina (I), s-pra note 84 at 299-300.89 143 Kan. 624, 56 P.2d 464 (1936).
90 KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1502 (1949).
91 Craig v. Craig, 143 Kan. 624, 56 P.2d 464, 466 (1936).
92 58 N.M. 597, 274 P.2d 127 (1954).
93 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-7-4 (1953).
94 235 N.Y. 14, 138 N.E. 490 (1923).
95 205 Misc. 836, 129 N.Y.S.2d 649 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
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it does not, irrespective of the full faith and credit clause. To deny
the validity of anything but domicile as a constitutional basis of juris-
diction is to accuse these states of gross usurpation of power. This,
it is submitted, is difficult to accept and is made less and less palatable
by each state decision which predicates divorce jurisdiction on some-
thing other than domicile.
Effect of Marriage as Basis of Jurisdiction
Recognizing marriage within the state as a constitutional basis of
jurisdiction produces at least two effects which might possibly be open
to criticism: (a) increase in the availability of divorces; and (b) de-
privation of the right of the domiciliary state to manage the domestic
relations of its citizens.
A satisfactory answer to the first may be readily found by the
simple expedient of considering the effects of the Williams case. In
that decision, one more divorce jurisdiction was added to those al-
ready existing.9 6 Since the Supreme Court did not consider such an
addition ill-advised in that case, there is no reason to consider the ad-
dition herein suggested as catastrophic. In answer to the second
point, let it suffice to say that recognition of the jurisdiction of the
marrying forum does not necessarily deprive the true domiciliary state
of its rights. There is nothing mandatory about such jurisdiction.
Further, although the dissolution of marriages is not a purely private
matter,97 the parties should have a right to bring a divorce action in
any court of competent jurisdiction. Even unler the law today, more
than one state may have divorce jurisdiction and the interest of one
may be greater than the other; yet no priority exists as between the
competitors.
Conclusion
No attempt has been made in the foregoing discussion to predi-
cate divorce jurisdiction on a basis foreign to the decisions of the
United States Supreme Court. Rather, extreme care has been exer-
cised in determining whether the fact of marriage creates such a rela-
tionship of interest between the state and the spouses as to warrant
the exercise of jurisdiction within the principles set out by the Court.
The cases require only an interest in the marital relationship on the
part of the state. That interest, it is submitted, exists where the
parties were married within the state. The wisdom of recognizing
such jurisdiction may be questioned in some quarters. However, we
are not here concerned with policy matters, but with jurisdiction-the
right and power of a sovereign to adjudicate rights. While perhaps
the state of domicile should have exclusive jurisdiction, the existing
law does not require such a conclusion.
96 That is, the state wherein the plaintiff alone establishes bona fide domicile.
Prior to the Williamns case, the rule of Haddock v. Haddock precluded full
faith and credit being given a decree of a court having only such jurisdiction.
•7 See 2 ScHOULER, MARRIAGE, DivORcE, SEPARATION AND DOMESTIc RELA-
T[ OS § 1478 (6th ed. 1921).
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